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1 Introduction
The secret ballot is a cornerstone of fair and free elections. It enables citizens to vote without
intimidation or fear of reprisal and is thought to be an important check against vote buying (Baland
and Robinson, 2008; Robinson and Verdier, 2013). Yet despite almost universal adoption of the
secret ballot, vote buying remains pervasive throughout the developing world and what explains its
persistence is not yet well understood.1
Several studies argue that political brokers play an important in role in sustaining vote buy-
ing (Finan and Schechter, 2012; Lehoucq, 2007; Schaffer, 2007; Stokes, 2005). It is common for
candidates and political parties to use political brokers as intermediaries in the exchange of tar-
geted benefits for votes. These brokers, who are often community leaders with extensive local
knowledge, are thought to exploit their social connections to facilitate vote-buying exchanges. In
particular, they are believed to acquire information about voters through their social networks that
enables them to buy votes using various complementary tactics.2 But whether social networks
diffuse information about voters that brokers leverage to sustain vote buying has yet to be assessed
empirically, due in large part to the lack of data on the social networks and vote-buying decisions
of the political brokers themselves.
In this paper, we use a novel survey of political brokers and voters in rural Paraguay to map
the social networks in which they are all embedded. We estimate the extent to which the network
positions of brokers and voters affect the brokers’ knowledge about voters and the brokers’ target-
1While reliable data are hard to come by, the share of the population offered a vote-buying transfer and the amount
they were offered is high across multiple countries. One third of respondents in the Philippines was offered an amount
between $1 and $30 in the 2010 elections (Cruz, 2019), 40% of respondents were offered an average of a quarter of
the minimum monthly wage during Uganda’s 2016 general election (Blattman et al., 2019), and most recently 34% of
respondents in Mexico were offered something for their vote in the 2018 general elections (Montes, 2018).
2These include a) monitoring of voter electoral behavior (Cruz, 2019; Stokes, 2005), b) targeting of voters who
are more likely to reciprocate (Finan and Schechter, 2012; Lawson and Greene, 2014), c) targeting of voters who are
likely copartisans but unlikely to vote (Nichter, 2008), and d) targeting of opinion leaders (Cox, 2015; Schaffer and
Baker, 2015).
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ing decisions. Following Banerjee et al. (2019), we compute a network statistic at the broker-voter
level called hearing. Hearing measures how much information a given broker might hear about
a specific voter in his network. While other studies have measured the social networks of voters
or even political candidates, this is to our knowledge the first study to systematically measure the
social network of political brokers, who are typically the key players buying citizens’ votes. More-
over, in contrast to previous studies, our network measure captures the relative network position
of brokers and voters, which allows us to estimate the information-diffusion role of networks in
facilitating vote-buying exchanges.
A key feature of our survey is that we designed it to elicit information about voters not only
directly from the voters, but also indirectly from the brokers. We take advantage of this information
structure in three important ways. First, in contrast to the extant literature, we measure vote buying
as reported by the brokers rather than reported by the voters.3 This allows us to use broker fixed
effects – exploiting only within-broker variation in vote buying – and thus control for broker-
specific confounders such as their position in the network or their willingness to admit to vote
buying. Second, because there are multiple political brokers within each village who all report
vote buying about overlapping voters, we can also further restrict our analysis to within-voter
variation. With voter fixed effects, we can account for voter-specific confounders such as the
voter’s socioeconomic status and network position. Finally, we ask the same questions about
voter characteristics – including questions about politically-relevant information and about social
preferences – to both brokers and voters. Using these two reports of the same information, we
can test the extent to which brokers’ knowledge about voters is diffused through the network and
subsequently used by brokers for targeting.
We find that our broker-voter network measure of hearing significantly predicts who each po-
litical broker targets with vote buying, as well as whether a voter claims to support the broker’s
3One notable exception is a recent study by Ravanilla, Haim and Hicken (2017) that collects broker-reported
measures of vote buying during the 2016 Philippine elections.
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party thereafter. This relationship holds using several different definitions of broker-reported vote
buying, including an index for whether the broker offered the voter something of value during the
electoral campaign or approached the voter to talk about the electoral campaign. The results of
our preferred specification imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in hearing accounts for
approximately 0.32 standard deviations of the vote-buying index. These results are robust not only
to the inclusion of both broker and voter fixed effects, but also to other identification concerns.
One concern is that brokers might target voters who are similar to them and that, as a result of
homophily, their similarity might be correlated with our hearingmeasure. Given the richness of our
data, we can control for the similarity between a voter and broker along various dimensions. These
attributes include their positions in the social network and socio-demographic characteristics. Our
findings are robust to all such additional broker-voter level controls as well as other modeling and
sampling choices.4
One might also be concerned that we measure political networks rather than social networks.
However, our social network data are made up of solely non-political ties that develop outside of the
political arena, such as family relationships, godparent relationships, and non-political gift giving
and lending. Consistent with this, we find low levels of political segregation in social networks as
measured by the Freeman segregation index (Freeman, 1978).
To directly substantiate the information-diffusion channel of social networks, we first show
that networks help to transmit information from voters to brokers. In particular, we find that our
measure of hearing strongly predicts whether the broker knows various voter characteristics which
have been previously found to be important for the effective targeting of vote-buying exchanges.
These characteristics include their partisan leanings and their social preferences. A one-standard
deviation increase in hearing is associated with a 0.21 standard deviation increase in an index of
overall-knowledge.
4We also show that our results are not driven by extreme values of hearing, parametric choices when computing
hearing, or potential bias due to partial sampling of the networks (Chandrasekhar and Lewis 2016).
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Second, we show that politically-relevant information explains the targeting of voters about
whom brokers can hear more information. Whether a broker targets a specific voter should not
simply be a function of how much he hears about that voter, but also what he hear about that voter.
Previous work points to the importance of voter partisanship (Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Lindbeck
and Weibull, 1987) and reciprocity (Finan and Schechter, 2012; Lawson and Greene, 2014) to
explain voter targeting by brokers. We find that brokers are more likely to target voters registered
to their party regardless of how much information they can hear about them, and regardless of
whether the voter is reciprocal. In contrast, brokers are more likely to target reciprocal voters
not registered to their party but about whom they can more easily learn information due to the
architecture of their social networks. We interpret this to suggest that political brokers are more
likely to target the voters who do not already support their party but who they have learned through
the network would reciprocate.
Information diffusion is not the only function that networks serve. In other contexts where
formal enforcement is lacking, networks have been shown to contribute to the enforcement of in-
formal contracts. Our hearing measure might explain the likelihood of vote-buying transactions
through its correlation with ease of transaction enforcement rather than information diffusion. To
deal with this concern, we control for three types of broker-voter-level network measures that the
literature suggests increase people’s ability to enforce informal transactions between one another:
social proximity (Chandrasekhar, Kinnan and Larreguy, 2018), the existence and the number of
“support pairs” (Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer and Tan, 2012), and whether the broker and voter
previously engaged in a non-political informal transaction. Not only is the impact of our hearing
measure robust to the inclusion of these additional variables, but the effects of these alternative net-
work measures are generally negative and insignificant, suggesting that our measure of information
diffusion does not capture the enforcement role of social networks. Additional results indicate that
the information-diffusion and transaction-enforcement roles of networks neither complement nor
substitute each other. Specifically, we show that the interaction of hearing with social proximity,
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the existence and the number of support pairs, and an indicator for whether the broker and voter
previously engaged in a non-political informal transaction are insignificant and generally small.
Another concern is that our measure of information diffusion captures other features of the
network. For example, brokers may target those voters who are good at transmitting information
to others and persuading them to vote for specific candidates (Cox, 2015; Ravanilla, Haim and
Hicken, 2017; Schaffer and Baker, 2015). By targeting a well-positioned voter, brokers could
potentially convince many individuals to vote for their candidates for the price of a single transfer.
The concern is then that voters about whom brokers are more likely to hear information might
also be good at persuading others. Our inclusion of voter fixed effects should ameliorate this
concern. Nevertheless, we also create network measures of how well-placed a voter is to spread
information, including degree centrality, eigenvector centrality, and diffusion centrality, and show
that our results are not driven by the interaction of these variables with our hearing measure.
This study contributes to various literatures. First, recent research focuses on the role of social
networks in explaining vote buying and electoral outcomes. Some papers focus on the social
network of the voter. For example, Cruz (2019) and Fafchamps and Labonne (2019) show that
well-connected voters are more likely to be targeted. Calvo and Murillo (2013) similarly show that
voters with more ties to political party members have higher expectations of accessing targeted
goods. Ravanilla, Haim and Hicken (2017) show that brokers target well-connected voters when
social networks are dense, but more reciprocal voters when social networks are sparse. Other
papers focus on the social network of the candidate or broker. For example, Szwarcberg (2012)
argues that brokers’ central position in non-political networks explains their ability to influence
vote choice. Cruz, Labonne and Querubín (2017) suggest that candidates benefit electorally from
higher centrality in family networks.
Different from previous studies that focus on measures of the position of one individual in the
network (either the voter, broker, or candidate), we map out the complete network and create a
broker-voter level measure of the connection between the two. Combining the network measure
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with broker-reported vote buying, we show that networks diffuse politically-relevant information
from voters to brokers, and brokers use this information to guide their targeting. In addition, our
fixed-effect approach allows us to control for important confounds at the broker- and voter-levels
that have plagued previous studies.
Second, a growing literature studies the effects of social networks on a wide range of political
outcomes other than vote buying. There is evidence that social networks affect perceptions and
voting behavior through the dissemination of information about unemployment (Alt et al., 2019),
electoral violence (Fafchamps and Vicente, 2013), and elections in general (Fafchamps, Vaz and
Vicente, 2019). Similarly, Arias et al. (2019), Bond et al. (2012) and Collier and Vicente (2014)
further show that social networks coordinate the electoral behavior of individuals, both explicitly
and tacitly, around information campaigns. Our findings also highlight the importance of social
networks in diffusing politically-relevant information, particularly from voters to brokers.
Third, there is a rich literature on the determinants of voter targeting. Dixit and Londregan
(1996) and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) suggest that politicians target voters with a weak ide-
ological attachment, while Cox and McCubbins (1986) and Nichter (2008) argue that politicians
target their core supporters. More recent work shows the importance of brokers (Larreguy, 2013;
Larreguy, Marshall and Querubín, 2016) and the targeting of reciprocal voters, supporters unlikely
to turn out, and opinion formers (Cox, 2015; Finan and Schechter, 2012; Lawson and Greene,
2014; Nichter, 2008; Schaffer and Baker, 2015).
We build off Finan and Schechter (2012) who show that, on average, brokers target voters who
are likely to reciprocate. Our study extends Finan and Schechter (2012) in at least two important
ways. First, we show that brokers are able to learn which voters are reciprocal, in large part because
of information diffusion through the social network. Different brokers are able to learn more or less
about specific voters depending on their relative network positions. Second, Finan and Schechter
(2012) find an average effect that brokers target voters who are more reciprocal. In this paper, we
show that this average effect comes specifically from brokers targeting reciprocal voters who are
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not members of the broker’s party, but about whom brokers can more easily learn information due
to the architecture of their social networks.
Finally, we contribute more generally to a growing literature on the role social networks play
in sustaining informal transactions. Networks play a key role in various settings (Chuang and
Schechter, 2015; Jackson, 2014; Munshi, 2014) particularly for their role in information diffusion
(Alatas et al., 2016; Alt et al., 2019; Banerjee et al., 2013, 2019), social learning (Chandrasekhar,
Larreguy and Xandri, 2019; Conley and Udry, 2010), and transaction enforcement (Bloch, Genicot
and Ray, 2008; Chandrasekhar, Kinnan and Larreguy, 2018; Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer and
Tan, 2012; Schechter and Yuskavage, 2012). Our study provides further evidence of the effects of
social networks on facilitating informal, and in this case illicit, transactions.
We structure the remainder of our paper as follows. In Section 2, we provide some background
on political brokers and vote buying in Paraguay. Section 3 describes our data and the construction
of our network measures, and presents descriptive evidence that indicates that political brokers are
selected from households that are significantly more central in their networks. In Section 4, we
describe our empirical strategy. Section 5 presents our main results, robustness checks, and tests
for alternative mechanisms. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
Paraguay was under the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner of the Colorado party from 1954 to
1989. Until 2008, when independent bishop Fernando Lugo won the presidency, the Colorado
party had controlled the national government for sixty-one years. Paraguay is effectively a two-
party system. The Colorado and Liberal parties are by far the strongest, although smaller parties
have recently gained modest popularity. As a result of the 2006 municipal elections – the elections
we study – half of the villages in our sample elected a Colorado mayor and the other half a Lib-
eral mayor. Also, at least one Colorado broker and one Liberal broker operated in each of these
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villages.5
Political parties in Paraguay are not strongly ideological, and there is little policy differentiation
between them (Lachi and Rojas-Schaffer, 2018; Parks, 2018). Political campaigns tend to be
highly personalized, and vote buying is thought to be an effective electoral strategy (Paraguay,
2018). This was evident in the focus groups conducted with politicians and brokers by Lachi
with Transparencia Paraguay in 2005 and by Lachi and Rojas-Schaffer in 2018. For example, a
broker of the Liberal party in the municipality of General Morínigo commented that “elections in
Paraguay are decided by the voters who are mobilized with money. A very small percentage of the
voters are loyal. The incentivized voters define [the election].” Moreover, vote buying is becoming
increasingly important to win elections. A broker of the Colorado party from the municipality of
General Aquino explained “there are three groups of voters: the captive, the thinkers, and those
that can be bought. Relative to previous elections the captive voters have declined, and the voters
that can be bought have increased.”
Political brokers, who in Paraguay are known as operadores políticos, act as intermediaries
between candidates and voters, exchanging money and favors for promises to vote accordingly.
The focus groups and interviews also highlighted the important role that brokers play in vote-
buying exchanges. As a politician of the Liberal Party in the municipal council of San Lorenzo
noted, “political brokers are fundamental since they know their zone well.” When asked how
brokers learn about voters, a Colorado broker in the municipality of General Aquino noted that
“it is all about ñe’embegue (gossip).” Lachi (2009) concludes that political brokers “are essential
for electoral campaigns and that their value is directly proportional to their integration within their
communities.”
Brokers leverage their local knowledge to target voters. A Liberal party official in Asunción
mentioned that brokers “know who [their] party supporters are.” Similarly, a Liberal official in the
5Among the smaller parties, the National Union of Ethical Citizens (UNACE), which was founded from a faction
of the Colorado party, also has one broker who operates in a village in our sample.
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governor’s office of Coronel Oviedo argued that brokers know “which Colorado and Liberal voters
would sell their vote.” Importantly, brokers suggest that the voters who they target are likely to
reciprocate with their vote. For example, a Liberal broker in the municipality of General Morínigo
mentioned that, “while some voters take the money and vote for another candidate, the number
of voters like that is small.” A Colorado broker in the municipality of General Aquino further
indicated that the voters they target “always thank favors.”
3 Data
Political brokers employ strategies that require knowledge about voters in order to target vote-
buying transfers. To test whether networks promote clientelistic exchanges through the transmis-
sion of information from voters to brokers, we combine vote-buying data from brokers and voters
originally collected for Finan and Schechter (2012), and social network data originally collected
for Ligon and Schechter (2012).
Households were selected to be surveyed as part of a panel data collection initiated in 1991 with
subsequent rounds collected in 1994, 1999, 2002, and 2007. In 2002, incentivized experiments
were also conducted. In 2007, more households were added such that in each village at least 30
households were surveyed. The 2007 survey also included a political section with questions about
the 2006 Paraguayan municipal elections, which was conducted with the same household member
who participated in the 2002 experiments whenever possible. We refer to the household member
who answered the political section of the 2007 survey as the ‘voter’ throughout the paper.
In 2010, we returned to ten of the villages across two departments in Paraguay for a sixth time
and asked the households in our original sample who the brokers working in their village were.
At this point, the villagers knew us well. We had conducted incentivized experiments with them
multiple times, and they had interacted with one co-author who is a Guaraní-speaking American in
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both 2002 and 2007.6 Many of the enumerators had been the same in round after round, and over
the decades the villagers had learned that there were no negative consequences from talking to us
and that we were to be trusted. We then felt comfortable to inquire about the brokers operating in
the villages in which we worked.
Households identified 43 brokers working in the ten villages, of whom we interviewed 38.
Four of the interviewed brokers did not live in the villages in which they worked, and so we do not
know how they fit in the village social network. It turned out that 20 of the interviewed brokers
were members of households that were part of our panel data sample, and thus we had directly
surveyed their social connections back in 2007. Other directly surveyed households mentioned
an additional 12 brokers as social ties, and thus we had indirect information about these brokers’
social connections. Thus, we only lack social network data for two of the surveyed brokers living
in the villages in which we worked, who we thus cannot include in our analysis.
Network measures
Our data include social networks collected in 2007 from 10 villages. In each village, between
30 and 48 households were surveyed delivering direct sampling rates ranging between 12 and
91% (with a cross-village mean of 47%). If we also consider non-surveyed households who were
mentioned as a social connection by at least one survey respondent, then we have network infor-
mation on between 54% and 100% of households in each village (with a cross-village mean of
88%). These social connections include family ties, godparenting ties, support networks, and non-
political transactions in the last year comprising transfers, gifts, and loans.7 Figure 1 provides an
6Guaraní is the indigenous language of Paraguay.
7More specifically, we construct undirected village-level networks where two households are connected if a mem-
ber of each household belongs to the same family (i.e., parents, children, siblings); a member of one household is the
godparent of the child of someone in the other household; one household would go to the other for monetary assistance
in times of need; if in the past year someone in the household provided monetary assistance when someone in the other
household fell sick; or if in the past year someone in one household made a non-political monetary or in-kind transfer
or lent money to someone in the other household.
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example of the social network of the households in one of the villages in our data, representing
257 connections between 81 households (of which 39 were directly surveyed).
To measure the extent to which a given broker b might hear information about a voter i in his
network, we construct a network statistic called hearing as in Banerjee et al. (2019). Define the
adjacency matrix g as the matrix where each row and column entry represents one household in
the village and an element equals 1 if the row and column household are connected and 0 if they
are not. We define T as the number of periods that information flows and p as the probability with
which it flows. In this case, hearing between the two individuals is defined as the i jth entry of the
matrix H = ∑Tt=1(pg)t .
For the intuition behind the computation of this measure, consider the process of diffusion of
a piece of information originating from voter i to broker b as illustrated in Figure 2. Sub-figure
(a) shows the social network and a piece of information originating from voter i in period 0. Sub-
figure (b) shows that in the first period, the two nodes directly connected to i (colored red) find
out the information with probability p ∈ (0,1]. Because broker b cannot hear the information in
the first period, Hi,b(1) = 0. Sub-figure (c) shows that in the second period, those who received
the information in the first period transmit it to the nodes with which they are directly connected
(colored red) with probability p. In subsequent periods, those who received the information in the
previous period transmit it to the nodes with which they are directly connected with probability np,
where n is the maximum number of times they could have received the information in the previous
period.8
It is not until period 3, shown in sub-figure (d), that broker b has a chance of hearing informa-
tion originating from voter i. We see that Hi,b(3) = 0.09 which means that, in the third period, we
expect the broker to have heard that information 0.09 times. By period 5, which is the last period
shown, we expect the broker to have heard that information 0.23 times. This process lasts for T
8Note that while the equation is the same, the description differs slightly from that given in Banerjee et al. (2019),
as described in Bramoullé and Genicot (2018).
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periods, where T is a finite positive integer, as information likely loses relevance with the passage
of time. The hearing measure, Hib is thus the expected number of times that broker b would hear
a piece of information originating from voter i if information is diffused according to this process
for T periods.
We set T equal to 7, which is the largest social distance between any voter and broker in
our sample. The social distance between two nodes is defined as the length of the shortest path
between them. If T were smaller than the largest social distance, information from some voters
would never reach some broker in their network. On the other hand, the greater the T , the more
likely information from voter i is to reach broker b more than once.
As in Banerjee et al. (2013), we set p equal to the inverse of the largest eigenvalue of the
adjacency matrix for each village’s social network.9 In the example network shown in Figure
2, the largest eigenvalue is 2.8 and so the probability of information transmission in this case is
p= 0.36.
We construct additional network statistics to address concerns associated with homophily and
other potential confounders. At the individual level, these measures include the clustering coeffi-
cient, degree centrality, betweenness centrality, diffusion centrality, and eigenvector centrality. At
the broker-voter level, these measures include social distance, the existence and number of sup-
port pairs, an indicator of prior non-political informal financial transactions, and social proximity.
Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer and Tan (2012) show that informal exchanges between a pair of
individuals that are locally enforceable and renegotiation-proof require that the pair is “supported”
by a common tie. Chandrasekhar, Kinnan and Larreguy (2018) show that the social proximity be-
tween two individuals explains their ability to sustain informal exchanges in the absence of contract
enforcement. We describe these measures in more detail in Appendix A.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our network measures. The values of these network
9Choosing larger values of p leads to total diffusion as T increases, while choosing smaller values of p causes
diffusion to die out as T increases. The inverse of the largest eigenvalue is the critical intermediate value between
these two processes.
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characteristics may be difficult to interpret on their own. If we compare them with the values for
the Indian villages studied in Banerjee et al. (2013), we see that the households in our villages have
lower average degree (number of connections) but higher values of all other network measures.
Thus, these villages are more inter-connected than the villages studied in India.10
Outcome variables
We measure vote buying in the 2006 Paraguayan municipal elections as reported by 32 brokers in
2010. Each broker provided information for the same approximately 30 randomly chosen voters
in their village. This provides us with a sample of 296 voters, none of whom lived in the same
household as one another, and a total of 932 broker-voter pair observations.11
Our main outcome variable is a standardized index that sums two measures of vote buying as re-
ported by brokers about each voter. These measures are indicators for whether a broker approached
a voter or offered the voter something during the electoral campaign. Additionally, we also use as
an outcome an indicator for whether the voter reports supporting the broker’s party in the 2007
survey – conducted a few months after the 2006 elections. With this outcome, we test the political
effects of vote-buying exchanges as facilitated by the information-diffusion role of networks.12 As
Table 1 indicates, the average broker approached 48% of the voters and offered something to 27%
of them. Voters also support the same party as the broker in 46% of observations.
To test whether our hearing measure predicts how well a broker knows a voter, we complement
our broker survey with data collected from voters in 2007. These data allow us to combine the
answers to a series of questions about voter characteristics that were asked to both brokers and
voters in a similar fashion. Appendix A explains the coding of both the broker and voter answers
10Some of the network measures may have lower values in both the Paraguayan and Indian villages since their
calculation comes from a sample rather than a census of households.
11We exclude 16 broker-voter observations for which the broker and voter were either the same person or lived in
the same household as one another.
12Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to analyze whether the voter voted for the broker’s party because we
do not know how he or she voted.
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in detail, as well as our criteria to categorize answers as matching in each case.
We construct indices of brokers’ knowledge about voters along three dimensions and sum these
three indices into an overall knowledge index. First, we compute a covariates index that combines
four different indicators of a broker’s general familiarity with the voter. These are indicators for
whether the broker states that he knows the voter; the broker can correctly name the spouse of
the voter; the broker can accurately state the years of education of the voter; and the broker can
correctly state the amount of land the voter owns. As Table 1 summarizes, brokers can respectively
identify the voters and their spouses in 89% and 77% of cases. Similarly, they can correctly assess
voters’ education and land 81% and 42% of the time, respectively.
Second, we compute a political index that combines two variables indicating a broker’s knowl-
edge of politically-relevant voter information. This includes whether the broker can correctly guess
the partisanship of the voter, and whether the broker accurately knows whether the voter voted in
the most recent election. Brokers are accurate about voters’ partisanship 59% of the time and
accurately know whether voters turned out in 63% of cases.
Third, we construct a social preferences index that combines two variables that indicate a bro-
ker’s knowledge about the social preferences of each voter. These are indicators for whether the
broker knows the extent to which the voter would retaliate wrong-doing and for whether the broker
knows whether the voter trusts at least half of those in his or her village. Brokers know the extent to
which voters would retaliate and whether voters trust others in their village respectively 59% and
66% of the time. Overall brokers exhibit significant knowledge about the voters in their villages.
Mediating variables
Beyond assessing how well brokers know the voters, we also test whether what they hear about
voters affects their targeting decisions. In particular, we focus on voters’ official party registra-
tion and their reciprocity, two characteristics which have been shown to explain voter targeting
(Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Finan and Schechter, 2012; Lawson and Greene, 2014; Lindbeck and
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Weibull, 1987). First, we use official publicly-available data on voters’ political affiliations to cre-
ate an indicator that the voter is not registered to the same party for which the broker operates.13
Since voters largely affiliate to a party when they first register to vote, this measure is less likely
to be endogenous relative to the measure of party support reported by voters in the 2007 survey
and mentioned as one of our outcome variables in the previous subsection.14 On average 59% of
voters are not registered to the same party as the broker.
Second, we use the experimental measure of voter reciprocity developed by Finan and Schechter
(2012). In 2002, Finan and Schechter (2012) ran a trust game with a sub-sample of the voters in our
dataset. In the game, a first mover was given 8000 Gs (1000 Gs were worth about 20 cents at the
time of the experiment) and had to decide whether to send nothing, 2000, 4000, 6000, or 8000 Gs
to a second mover, who received the amount tripled. The second mover could keep all the money or
return as much as she wanted. Before finding out how much money she would receive, the second
mover had to outline a contingency plan (i.e., how much of 6000 Gs, 12,000 Gs, 18,000 Gs, and
24,000 Gs she would return), which was implemented accordingly. All players played once as first
and once as second mover. To separate pure altruism from reciprocity, Finan and Schechter (2012)
calculate the reciprocity of a second mover by subtracting the share that she would return if she
received 6000 Gs from the average share that she would return if she received 12,000, 18,000, or
24,000 Gs. They censor this measure below zero. This measure is only available for 85 voters and
271 broker-voter observations in our sample. Average reciprocity in these observations is 0.043.
Broker selection
Before turning to our main empirical analysis, in this section, we present some descriptive analysis
on political broker social networks. If brokers need to know voters well in order to buy votes, and
13Due to the public availably of these data, brokers do not need to use the social network to learn voters’ official
party registration.
14Indeed, the correlation between party affiliation and party support is far from perfect – the correlation is 0.58 for
the Colorado party and 0.65 for the Liberal party.
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if they acquire this information through their networks, then we might expect brokers to be, on
average, more centrally located within their networks. This is precisely what we see in Figure 3,
which plots kernel density estimates of within-village percentiles of degree centrality, betweenness
centrality, diffusion centrality, and eigenvector centrality for broker households (32 observations)
and voter households (1,000 observations).15 Brokers mostly come from the upper quartile of the
network centrality distributions, with very few brokers selected from households in the lower tails.
In Table 2, we refine this analysis further by regressing network measures of centrality on an
indicator for whether a household contains a broker as well as village fixed effects. We include all
households in the village that were either directly or indirectly sampled and control for an indicator
for whether the household was directly sampled in our network survey. In Panel A, we consider
overall standardized centrality measures as outcomes,16 while in Panel B we consider the within-
village percentile of each centrality measure. Results in Panel A show that, on average, broker
households have a significantly higher network centrality ranging from a 0.10 standard deviation
higher betweenness centrality to 0.60 standard deviation higher eigenvector centrality. Results in
Panel B further indicate that broker household centrality is, on average, between 8 (betweenness
centrality) and 21 (eigenvector centrality) percentiles greater than that of other households.17
4 Empirical Strategy
Our baseline regressions are of the following form:
yibv = α+βHibv+ηbv+ εibv, (1)
15Appendix Figure B1 plots the analogous figures for the levels of the standardized network measures rather than
their percentiles.
16In Appendix Table B1, we present the summary statistics for the non-standardized centrality measures.
17These results are consistent with Ravanilla, Haim and Hicken (2017), who find that brokers in the Philippines
exhibit higher than average betweenness centrality compared to a random sample of villagers.
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where yibv is an outcome defined for voter i and broker b in village v, Hibv is the hearing measure
that captures the information-diffusion role of social networks, and ηbv is a broker fixed effect.
In addition to restricting to within-broker variation, a more demanding specification also includes
voter fixed effects θiv to address individual-level confounders. We use two-way clustering of our
standard errors, clustering at both the broker and voter levels.18
Our research design innovates on previous work in that the inclusion of broker and voter fixed
effects allows us to flexibly control for observable and unobservable broker- and voter-specific
factors. In particular, we can control for broker-level determinants of a brokers’ ability to en-
gage in vote buying such as their relative importance in their social network (Szwarcberg, 2012).
Similarly, we can control for voter-level determinants of vote buying including partisanship, the
likelihood that the voter turns out to vote (Nichter, 2008), the voter’s social preferences (Finan and
Schechter, 2012; Lawson and Greene, 2014), and the voter’s relative importance in their social net-
work (Schaffer and Baker, 2015). In the absence of broker and voter fixed effects, hearing might
simply capture the effect of observable and unobservable confounders.
To deal with the concern that our results capture homophily between brokers and voters, we
follow the approach of Chandrasekhar, Kinnan and Larreguy (2018) and show robustness to in-
cluding various broker-voter-level controls. First, we include the absolute age difference between
the broker and voter, an indicator for them having the same gender, and the geographic distance
between the broker’s and voter’s homes. Second, we add the absolute difference in their degree
centrality, clustering coefficient, betweenness centrality, diffusion centrality, and eigenvector cen-
trality. Third, we further include broker fixed effects interacted with the voter’s degree centrality,
clustering coefficient, betweenness centrality, diffusion centrality, and eigenvector centrality.
We further address the concern that hearing is just one of many potential measures of the rela-
tive network position of brokers and voters, and its effect may be confounded. We show robustness
to controlling for other broker-voter-level network measures, including social proximity, the exis-
18Our final estimation sample contains dyads representing 32 brokers and 295 voters.
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tence and the number of support pairs between a broker and a voter, and whether a broker and a
voter have previously engaged in an informal non-political transaction. We add these controls both
independently and jointly with all other controls.
5 Results
In this section, we begin by showing that hearing, our measure of information diffusion between
a broker and a voter through their social networks, is robustly associated with whether the broker
targets the voter for vote buying (our primary outcome of interest) and whether the voter claims
to support the party of the broker just after the election. These correlations are robust to several
potential identification and measurement concerns. We then provide direct evidence that these
effects are driven by the diffusion of politically-relevant information from voters to brokers through
their social networks, information which brokers leverage to target voters. Lastly, we rule out some
alternative explanations.
Results on vote buying
In Table 3, we report the association of hearing and an index that measures the targeting of vote
buying by a broker to a voter, as reported by the broker. This vote-buying index takes the sum of
the indicators for whether the broker offered the voter something during the electoral campaign and
whether the broker approached the voter to talk about the electoral campaign, and is standardized
to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Column (1) includes only broker fixed effects, whereas
column (2) additionally includes voter fixed effects. Continuing with this more robust specification,
in columns (3) and (4) we present estimates of the effects of hearing on each component of the
vote-buying index.
Throughout columns (1) to (4), hearing is positively associated with the vote-buying index and
its constituent elements. Our preferred specification in column (2) implies that a one-standard-
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deviation increase in hearing accounts for a 0.32-standard-deviation increase in the vote-buying
index. These results suggest that the diffusion of information through social networks plays an
important role in determining which brokers target which voters.
If social networks enable brokers to target voters effectively, then the voters who brokers hear
more about should also be more likely to support that broker’s party near the time of the election.
We test this in column (5) using our preferred specification from column (2) with both broker and
voter fixed effects. We see that hearing is positively associated with the likelihood that the voter
supports the broker’s party. A one-standard-deviation increase in hearing is associated with a 12
percentage point (28%) increase in the likelihood that the voter supports the broker’s party. While
we lack data on which party voters cast their ballots for, this result suggests that the vote buying
mediated by the information-diffusion role of networks is effective at persuading voters to support
the broker’s party.
Whether a broker targets a given voter might depend not only on what he hears about that voter,
but also about how much the other competing brokers hear about that same voter. To explore the
possibility of strategic interactions between brokers, Appendix Table B2 reports coefficients from
regressions similar to those in column (2) of Table 3 but that additionally control for the hearing
of the voter with brokers from the other party. We can additionally control for its interaction with
the broker’s own hearing with that voter. To measure the hearing of the voter with brokers from
the other party, we consider either the mean or the maximum of their hearing with all brokers from
other parties. The coefficients on the hearing of other brokers is small and statistically insignificant.
This suggests that only a broker’s own hearing matters for whether he targets the voter, and that
the hearing of other brokers does not affect a broker’s targeting.
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Identification and measurement concerns
Identification concerns
In this section, we explore whether our main findings are robust to a series of identification con-
cerns. A central concern in the vote-buying literature is that self-reported measures of vote buying
are subject to social desirability bias, which may itself be correlated with the explanatory variable
of interest, in our case hearing. This is unlikely to be a source of bias in our setting for at least two
reasons. First, in contrast to the previous literature, our measures of vote buying are reported by
the brokers themselves. We were able to collect this type of information because of years of work
in the villages that helped to establish trust between the researchers and brokers.
Second, because our social network measure of hearing varies at the broker-voter level, we
can include both broker and voter fixed effects to exploit within-broker and within-voter variation.
This allows us to control for any social desirability bias that is specific to each broker and to each
voter. For example, broker fixed effects control for any general tendency a broker may have to
underreport vote buying. Similarly, voter fixed effects control for the possibility that brokers may
be more likely to remember having targeted voters with a higher network centrality.
Another concern is that brokers’ ability to engage in vote buying is correlated with their ability
to hear information about voters in their social network. For example, focusing on the case of a
single network in Argentina, Szwarcberg (2012) argues that a broker’s network centrality is what
allows her to successfully mobilize voters for her party. Our use of broker fixed effects addresses
this concern, in addition to any other broker-specific characteristics that may be correlated with
hearing. Another related concern is that hearing is correlated with voter-specific traits that brokers
may target on. The literature has emphasized traits such as a voter’s partisanship, her likelihood
of turnout, her social preferences, and her relative importance in the social network. The fact that
our results are robust to including voter fixed effects indicates that this concern is not driving our
results.
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An additional concern is that our social networks are centered on party lines. This is unlikely
to be the case for two reasons. First, as we mentioned above, we constructed these social net-
works based on non-political ties. Second, we explicitly test for sorting along party lines using
the Freeman segregation index (FSI) (Freeman, 1978). This index measures the extent of segrega-
tion among those registered to the same party in our village networks. Given two distinct groups
in a population, the FSI is defined as 1− ppi , where p denotes the observed proportion of between-
group connections and pi the expected proportion if connections were generated randomly. The FSI
ranges between 0 (a randomly generated network) and 1 (a network with fully segregated groups).
The average FSI in our networks is 0.126 indicating that partisan segregation is low in our village
networks. As a benchmark, the FSI of partisan segregation within Twitter networks in the 111th
United States Congress is 0.590 (Sparks, 2010).
While broker and voter fixed effects deal with broker- and voter-specific characteristic that
might confound our estimates, there still remains the possibility that broker-voter-specific factors
are biasing our results. In particular, brokers might target voters who share similar traits and, due
to homophily, the similarity in traits might correlate with the network measure of hearing. In
column (1) of Table 4, we test the robustness of the results presented in column (2) of Table 3 to
the addition of broker-voter controls as described in detail in Section 4. These controls capture
similarity in age, gender, geographic proximity, and network centrality. As we see in column (1),
the addition of these broker-voter controls leaves our original point estimate essentially unchanged,
even though the R2 increases by 15 percent.
The ability of brokers and voters to use their social network to enforce informal transactions,
such as vote buying, might also confound our results. To address this concern, we control for
network measures that the literature suggests capture the ability of individuals to enforce informal
transactions with one another. In particular, we control for social proximity between the broker and
voter, the existence and the number of support pairs between the broker and voter, and whether the
broker and voter have engaged in an informal non-political financial transaction in the year sur-
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rounding the election. We add these controls to our main specification independently in columns
(2) to (5) of Table 4, and jointly in column (6). The magnitude and significance of the coefficient
on hearing is robust to the inclusion of all of these variables. In addition, none of these alternative
network transaction measures predicts which voters are targeted by which brokers even though
in some cases they are highly correlated with our hearing measure. For example, the correlation
between hearing and social proximity is 0.86 (p < 0.0001), and between hearing and having en-
gaged in a non-political financial transaction is 0.41 (p< 0.0001). Given the results in Table 4, we
think that it is unlikely that either homophily or the transaction-enforcement role of networks are
confounding our main findings.
In Appendix Table B3, we also test whether the transaction-enforcement role of networks com-
plements or substitutes the effect information diffusion has on targeting. We do so by including
interactions between hearing and social proximity, the existence and the number of support pairs,
and an indicator for whether the broker and voter previously engaged in non-political informal
transactions. Overall, we find no evidence that the importance of information diffusion for vote
buying varies according to the ability of brokers and voter to enforce informal transactions.
Measurement concerns
We next address three measurement concerns. First, there is a possible concern that our results are
driven by extreme values in our hearing measure. To deal with this concern, Figure 4 illustrates
how the effect of hearing on vote-buying targeting varies nonparametrically. Specifically, it shows
the effect of each hearing decile on vote buying. The fairly linear effect across deciles dismisses
the concerns that our results are driven by extreme values in our hearing measure.
Second, we test whether our results are robust to our choice of T (i.e., the number of periods
we allow for information originating from a voter to circulate through the network and reach a
broker) used to compute hearing. Recall that we set T equal to 7, which is the largest social
distance between a voter and a broker in any village network in our sample. We conduct two
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complementary exercises to show that our results are not driven by this choice of T . In Panel A
in Table B4, we set T equal to the maximum social distance between brokers and voters in each
village’s network, which varies between 3 and 7 across the villages. Our results are robust to
allowing T to vary by village in this manner. In Figure 5, we show how the effect of hearing in
our main specification varies as T goes from 1 to 50 at intervals of five. The effect is robust to the
choice of T and starts out increasing before it flattens out at around T = 10.
A third possible concern is that we have a partial sampling of households in the village net-
works, which may bias our estimates (Chandrasekhar and Lewis, 2016). We note, however, that
the average direct sampling rate in our villages is 47% which is higher than most of the network
literature in developing countries.19 In addition, our villages include some network information
(either direct or indirect) about 83% of households, on average. To address this potential concern,
we assess how our estimates are affected when we drop the two villages with the lowest direct
sampling rates (12% and 24%). Despite losing a considerable part of the baseline sample (27%),
Panel B of Table B4 indicates that our estimates remain largely unchanged in terms of size and
significance when focusing on the villages with larger sampling rates, and thus it is unlikely that
our findings are driven by our imperfect network sampling.
Results on broker’s knowledge about voters
To substantiate the information-diffusion channel, we conduct two additional empirical exercises.
First, we look at whether brokers know more information about voters with whom they have a
higher value of hearing. Table 5 reports the effects of hearing on different measures of the broker’s
knowledge about each voter. As previously discussed, we construct indices measuring knowledge
of demographics, of politically-relevant information, and of voter social preferences.20 We also
19According to Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2016), papers using social network data in developing countries have a
median sampling rate of 42%, and only a bit over a quarter of them have sampling rates above 47%.
20In Appendix Table B5, we present results on the constituent components of the indices measuring brokers’
knowledge about voters.
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construct an index that sums all three indices. In odd columns, we only include broker fixed
effects, and in even columns, we also add voter fixed effects.
The coefficient on hearing is significant, positive, and robust, across all outcomes and speci-
fications reported in Table 5.21 These results suggest that information diffusion from a voter to a
broker through their social network facilitates the broker’s acquisition of information about voters.
Moreover, the estimates are sizable. A one standard deviation increase in hearing is associated
with a 0.21 standard deviation increase in overall knowledge (column (2)), 0.17 standard deviation
increase in knowledge of demographic characteristics (column (4)), a 0.21 standard deviation in-
crease in politically-relevant information (column (6)), and a 0.14 standard deviation increase in
knowledge about voter social preferences (column (8)).
Second, Table 6 provides direct evidence that information flows explain how brokers choose
which voters to target. Brokers should not just target those about whom they hear more infor-
mation, but should target voters about whom the information they hear makes them think a vote-
buying transfer will be more effective. To explore whether it matters what specifically the broker
hears about the voter, we add hearing’s interactions with politically-relevant voter characteristics
—voter reciprocity and whether the voter is registered to the broker’s party.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 replicate the same columns in Table 3 but for the smaller
sample of broker-voter pairs for which we have the experimental measure of voter reciprocity used
in Finan and Schechter (2012). Columns (3) and (4) add this measure of voter reciprocity, along
with its interaction with hearing. In columns (5) and (6), we instead add an indicator for whether
the voter is not registered to the broker’s party as well as its interaction with hearing. Individuals
usually register for a party at the same time that they first register to vote, and they do not often
change official party registration. Party affiliation is public information to which middlemen should
have access. Lastly, columns (7) and (8) include the triple interaction, as well as the lower-order
21Appendix Table B6 shows that the results on the overall knowledge index are robust to considering the specifica-
tions in the Table 4 for vote buying.
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interactions and levels, of hearing, voter reciprocity, and the indicator for whether the voter is
registered to the broker’s party.
Findings in columns (3) and (4) suggests that, on average, brokers target voters that they learn
through the network are more reciprocal. In other words, it is not enough for a voter to simply be
reciprocal to be targeted. A reciprocal voter must be connected to a broker in such a way that the
broker hears about the voter’s reciprocity. Results in columns (5) and (6) suggest that information
diffusion through the network is not necessary for brokers to learn about voters’ official party
registration, as would be expected since this is not private information. Brokers are more likely to
target voters who are registered with their party no matter how they are connected in the network.
We then look at the joint effects of voter reciprocity and party registration. Results in columns
(7) and (8) highlight that the targeting of reciprocal voters is concentrated among voters that are
not registered to the same party as the broker, but about whom the brokers can learn the voter’s
reciprocity level. We interpret the positive coefficient on the triple interaction as indicating that
political brokers are more likely to target the voters who are not affiliated with their party if they
have learned through the network that the voter is reciprocal. Altogether, these findings suggest
that brokers leverage the voter information that is diffused via their social network to guide their
targeting.
Table 7 follows the same structure of Table 6, but uses as an outcome an indicator for whether
the voter reports she supports the broker’s party after the election. The results follow the same
pattern as those in Table 6. We take this as further indication that the vote buying guided by the
information that social networks diffuse about voters to brokers is effective at persuading targeted
voters to vote for the broker’s party.
Alternative interpretation
Lastly, we rule out the alternative interpretation that our results are driven by brokers targeting
those voters who are good at transmitting information to other voters and persuading them to vote
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for specific candidates. Specifically, the concern is that better-connected voters might also be able
to persuade more voters in the village. While controlling for voter fixed effects largely deals with
this concern, columns (1) to (4) in Table 8 sequentially add the interaction of hearing with voter
eigenvector centrality, betweenness centrality, degree, and diffusion centrality. These variables
capture the ability of a voter to spread information. These interactions are always negative and
two of them are statistically insignificant, further dismissing the idea that brokers are differentially
targeting more well-connected voters in an attempt to purchase more persuasion.
6 Conclusion
Vote buying is pervasive throughout the developing world, and political brokers are key interme-
diaries in this exchange. We use village network and vote-buying data to show that the amount of
information a political broker hears about a voter through the social network predicts whether the
broker tries to buy the voter’s vote. We also show that the more information a broker hears about
a voter, the more the broker learns politically-relevant information about the voter, including her
political leanings and even social preferences. Importantly, our results indicate that the targeting
decisions of brokers depend not only on how much information the broker hears, but also on the
type of information. Specifically, we find that, among the voters who are not registered to the bro-
ker’s party and about whom a broker can hear more information, brokers are more likely to target
the reciprocal.
Overall, our results highlight how the diffusion of information through social networks can help
to sustain an electoral practice that is widely believed to weaken political accountability and limit
the provision of public goods. Much of the previous literature has focused on the positive impacts
of information diffusion in networks on outcomes such as technology adoption. But, information
diffusion through networks can also help sustain informal and illegal transactions such as insider
trading, organized crime, and terrorism (Ahern, 2017; Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2004; Patac-
chini and Zenou, 2008).
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Social network mapping of households in a sample village
Notes: The graph represents the social network in one of the villages in our sample. It shows all connections between
households (brokers and voters) directly or indirectly sampled within the village.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the computation of the hearing measure between a voter i and a broker b
(a) Hi,b(0) = 0 (b) Hi,b(1) = 0
(c) Hi,b(2) = 0 (d) Hi,b(3) = 2∗0.363 = 0.09
(e) Hi,b(4) = 2∗0.363+ 2∗0.364 = 0.12
(f) Hi,b(5) =
2∗0.363+ 2∗0.364+ 19∗0.365 = 0.23
Notes: The caption in each subfigure shows the computation of hearing between voter i and broker b for each period
t. We consider p to be the inverse of the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix, 2.8 (i.e., p= 1/2.8 = 0.36). The
numbers in the nodes colored in red indicate the maximum number of times that information about voter i might have
been transmitted to a node in the previous period.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Observations Mean Standard
Deviation
Non-standardized Network Measures
Hearing 932 0.120 0.128
Social proximity 932 0.494 0.253
Voter’s degree centrality 932 8.935 4.548
Voter’s clustering coefficient 932 0.244 0.188
Voter’s betweenness centrality 932 0.045 0.050
Voter’s diffusion centrality 932 8.956 5.426
Voter’s eigenvector centrality 932 0.121 0.081
Absolute difference in degree centrality 932 4.921 4.141
Absolute difference in clustering coefficient 932 0.202 0.223
Absolute difference in betweenness centrality 932 0.042 0.046
Absolute difference in diffusion centrality 932 5.456 4.279
Absolute difference in eigenvector centrality 932 0.081 0.061
Existence of a support pair 932 0.529 0.499
Number of support pairs 932 1.351 1.852
Previous transaction 932 0.060 0.238
Mediating Measures
Experimental reciprocity 271 0.043 0.075
Not registered to the same party 805 0.504 0.500
Additional Controls
Absolute age difference 932 16 12
Broker and voter have the same gender 932 0.580 0.494
Distance in kilometers between the broker’s 932 1.409 0.901
and voter’s residences
Outcome Measures
Vote-buying Measures
Voter supports the broker’s party 932 0.461 0.499
Components of the vote-buying targeting index:
Broker approached voter during electoral 932 0.477 0.500
campaign
Broker offered voter something 932 0.273 0.446
Knowledge Measures
Components of the covariates index:
Broker knows voter 932 0.887 0.316
Broker knows voter’s spouse 932 0.773 0.419
Broker knows voter’s years of education 932 0.807 0.395
Broker knows voter’s amount of land 932 0.421 0.494
Components of the political index:
Broker knows voter’s partisanship 932 0.593 0.491
Broker knows whether the voter votes 932 0.629 0.483
Components of the social preferences index:
Broker knows the frequency with which 932 0.586 0.493
voter would retaliate
Broker knows whether the voter generally 932 0.656 0.475
trusts others in the village
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Table 2: Brokers’ differential relative position within their village social network
Degree Betweenness Diffusion Eigenvector
centrality centrality centrality centrality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Overall standardized centrality measures
Broker 0.3844*** 0.1046 0.5739*** 0.6021***
(0.1233) (0.1538) (0.1457) (0.1428)
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
Village FE X X X X
Directly surveyed FE X X X X
Observations 1,032 1,032 1,032 1,032
R2 0.5406 0.2850 0.3581 0.3840
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B: Within-village percentiles of centrality measures
Broker 13.4666*** 7.8281** 19.8667*** 21.4197***
(3.5972) (3.6530) (4.4525) (4.6490)
Mean of Dependent Variable 50.0964 50.0160 49.9816 49.9884
Village FE X X X X
Directly surveyed FE X X X X
Observations 1,032 1,032 1,032 1,032
R2 0.4998 0.4722 0.2827 0.2173
Notes: Sample includes household-level observations for all households directly and indirectly sampled
in our villages. All specifications include village fixed effects and control for whether the household
was surveyed directly about their network ties. The dependent variables in Panel A are standardized
(mean 0, s.d. 1), while those in Panel B are the within-village percentiles (ranging from 1 to 100) for
each corresponding outcome. * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Table 3: Effect of hearing on vote-buying targeting
Broker Broker Support the
Vote-buying targeting offered approached same
index voter voter party
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hearing 0.2114*** 0.3215*** 0.0720** 0.1833*** 0.1174***
(0.0436) (0.0574) (0.0270) (0.0309) (0.0387)
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.0000 -0.0000 0.2725 0.4775 0.4614
Broker FE X X X X X
Voter FE X X X X
Observations 932 932 932 932 932
R2 0.3983 0.6129 0.6688 0.5181 0.4167
Notes: All specifications include broker fixed effects. The vote-buying targeting index is a standardized
sum of indicators for whether the broker offered the voter something during the electoral campaign and
whether the broker approached the voter to talk about the electoral campaign. “Support the same party”
is an indicator that the voter claims to support the broker’s party shortly after the election. Hearing is
standardized. Standard errors use two-way clustering at the broker and voter levels. * p < 0.10, **
p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Table 4: Effect of hearing on vote-buying targeting, controlling for homophily and network
measures that predict the enforcement ability of the network
Vote-buying targeting index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hearing 0.3341*** 0.2474* 0.3456*** 0.3656*** 0.3208*** 0.3729**
(0.0869) (0.1241) (0.0586) (0.0740) (0.0568) (0.1490)
Social proximity 0.0607 0.0352
(0.0961) (0.1023)
Existence of a support pair -0.0989 -0.1499
(0.1066) (0.1395)
Number of support pairs -0.0761 -0.0582
(0.0853) (0.1216)
Previous transaction 0.0048 -0.1720
(0.1335) (0.1683)
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
Broker FE X X X X X X
Voter FE X X X X X X
Broker-Voter Controls X X
Observations 932 932 932 932 932 932
R2 0.7053 0.6133 0.6136 0.6135 0.6129 0.7075
Notes: All specifications include broker and voter fixed effects. The dependent variable is a standard-
ized index that takes the sum of indicators for whether the broker offered the voter something during the
electoral campaign and whether the broker approached the voter to talk about the electoral campaign.
Columns (1) and (6) control for the following variables at the broker-voter level: a) an indicator for the
broker and voter having the same gender; b) standardized geographical distance between the broker’s
and voter’s residences; c) standardized absolute difference in age, degree centrality, clustering coeffi-
cient, betweenness centrality, diffusion centrality, and eigenvector centrality; and d) broker fixed effects
interacted with voter’s degree centrality, clustering coefficient, betweenness centrality, diffusion central-
ity, and eigenvector centrality. All network measures (except the indicator variables) are standardized.
Standard errors use two-way clustering at the broker and voter levels. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p< 0.01.
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Table 5: Effect of hearing on brokers’ knowledge about voters
Overall knowledge Covariates Political Social preferences
index index index index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hearing 0.3203*** 0.2145*** 0.2692*** 0.1703*** 0.3293*** 0.2088*** 0.1621*** 0.1401***
(0.0426) (0.0343) (0.0425) (0.0411) (0.0524) (0.0508) (0.0499) (0.0441)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Broker FE X X X X X X X X
Voter FE X X X X
Observations 932 932 932 932 932 932 932 932
R2 0.1668 0.6565 0.1737 0.6237 0.1338 0.6571 0.0725 0.6942
Notes: All specifications include broker fixed effects. The dependent variables are standardized indices that aggregate what the broker
knows about the voter in three categories. The Covariates index aggregates indicators for whether the broker knows the voter, whether
the broker knows the voter’s spouse’s name, whether the broker knows how much land the voter owns, and whether the broker knows
the voter’s years of education. The Political index aggregates indicators for whether the broker knows the voter’s partisan leanings, and
whether the broker knows if the voter turned out to vote in the previous election. The Social preferences index aggregates indicators for
whether the broker knows whether the voter generally trusts others in the village, and whether the broker knows the frequency with which
the voter would retaliate wrongdoing. The Overall knowledge index aggregates indicators from all three knowledge categories: covariates,
political and social preferences. Hearing is standardized. Standard errors use two-way clustering at the broker and voter levels. * p< 0.10,
** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Table 6: Effect of hearing on vote-buying targeting, by party registration and experimental reciprocity
Vote-buying targeting index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hearing 0.2405*** 0.2836*** 0.2349*** 0.2659** 0.1555** 0.1157 0.1488** 0.1381*
(0.0545) (0.0999) (0.0516) (0.1067) (0.0612) (0.0799) (0.0569) (0.0743)
Experimental reciprocity -0.0636 0.1454
(0.0659) (0.1421)
Not reg. to same party -0.6664*** -0.7726*** -0.6918*** -0.8127***
(0.1266) (0.1671) (0.1372) (0.1764)
Experimental reciprocity ×
Hearing
0.1272* 0.1215 -0.0808 -0.0556
(0.0668) (0.1376) (0.0814) (0.1280)
Experimental reciprocity ×
Not reg. to same party
-0.2100 -0.2485
(0.1615) (0.2210)
Not reg. to same party × Hearing 0.0558 0.0400 0.0515 0.0515
(0.0994) (0.1410) (0.0912) (0.1387)
Not reg. to same party × Hearing
× Experimental reciprocity
0.2870** 0.2836*
(0.1046) (0.1436)
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
Broker FE X X X X X X X X
Voter FE X X X X
Observations 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244
R2 0.4940 0.6229 0.5106 0.6292 0.5823 0.6991 0.6089 0.7192
Notes: All specifications include broker fixed effects. The dependent variable is a standardized index that takes the sum of indicators for
whether the broker offered the voter something during the electoral campaign and whether the broker approached the voter to talk about
the electoral campaign. “Not reg. to same party” indicates the voter is not officially registered with the broker’s party. “Experimental
reciprocity” is the experimental measure of reciprocity used in Finan and Schechter (2012). The coefficients for experimental reciprocity
in Columns (4) and (8) are absorbed by the voter fixed effects. Hearing and experimental reciprocity are standardized. Standard errors use
two-way clustering at the broker and voter levels. * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Table 7: Effect of hearing on voter support for the broker’s party, by party registration and experimental reciprocity
Support same party
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hearing 0.1080*** 0.1897** 0.1081*** 0.1836** 0.0219 0.0240 0.0126 0.0327
(0.0354) (0.0699) (0.0326) (0.0721) (0.0367) (0.0452) (0.0343) (0.0452)
Experimental reciprocity -0.0569 0.0656*
(0.0401) (0.0356)
Not reg. to same party -0.6889*** -0.8719*** -0.6950*** -0.8850***
(0.0635) (0.0680) (0.0638) (0.0662)
Experimental reciprocity ×
Hearing
0.0707* 0.0420 -0.0104 -0.0168
(0.0356) (0.0542) (0.0256) (0.0223)
Experimental reciprocity ×
Not reg. to same party
-0.0913* -0.0538
(0.0472) (0.0502)
Not reg. to same party × Hearing 0.0537 -0.0426 0.0582 -0.0442
(0.0573) (0.0632) (0.0570) (0.0593)
Not reg. to same party × Hearing
× Experimental reciprocity
0.0660 0.0949***
(0.0451) (0.0326)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.4426 0.4426 0.4426 0.4426 0.4426 0.4426 0.4426 0.4426
Broker FE X X X X X X X X
Voter FE X X X X
Observations 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244
R2 0.2310 0.4287 0.2565 0.4317 0.6110 0.8050 0.6217 0.8130
Notes: All specifications include broker fixed effects. The dependent variable is is an indicator that the voter claims to support the broker’s
party shortly after the election. “Not reg. to same party” indicates the voter is not officially registered with the broker’s party. “Experimental
reciprocity” is the experimental measure of reciprocity used in Finan and Schechter (2012). The coefficients for experimental reciprocity
in Columns (4) and (8) are absorbed by the voter fixed effects. Hearing and experimental reciprocity are standardized. Standard errors use
two-way clustering at the broker and voter levels. * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Table 8: Effect of hearing on vote-buying targeting, by voter-diffusion measures
Vote-buying targeting index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hearing 0.3569*** 0.3598*** 0.3353*** 0.3324***
(0.0622) (0.0728) (0.0701) (0.0556)
Voter’s degree centrality ×
Hearing
-0.0696**
(0.0310)
Voter’s diffusion centrality (with T = 10) ×
Hearing
-0.0563
(0.0408)
Voter’s eigenvector centrality ×
Hearing
-0.0237
(0.0464)
Voter’s betweenness centrality ×
Hearing
-0.0514*
(0.0257)
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
Broker FE X X X X
Voter FE X X X X
Observations 932 932 932 932
R2 0.6144 0.6137 0.6130 0.6139
Notes: All specifications include broker and voter fixed effects. The dependent variable is a standardized
index that takes the sum of indicators for whether the broker offered the voter something during the
electoral campaign and whether the broker approached the voter to talk about the electoral campaign.
The coefficients for voter’s degree centrality, eigenvector centrality, and diffusion centrality are absorbed
by the voter fixed effects. Hearing and voter diffusion measures are standardized. Standard errors use
two-way clustering at the broker and voter levels. * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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A Variable Construction
A.1 Variables using broker and voter responses
Broker knows the spouse of the voter: an indicator that the broker can correctly name the spouse
of the voter.
Broker knows the voter’s years of education: an indicator that the broker can accurately state the
years of education of the voter within a 3-year margin of error. To estimate this, we cross-checked
the voter’s response regarding his years of education with the broker’s corresponding estimate.
Broker knows the voter’s amount of land: an indicator variable that the broker can correctly
state how many hectares of land the voter owns within a 25% or 1-hectare margin of error. To
estimate this, we cross-checked the voter’s response regarding his land ownership with the broker’s
corresponding estimate.
Broker knows the partisanship of the voter: an indicator that the broker is accurate when stat-
ing the voter’s partisanship. The brokers were asked to indicate where they would situate voters
along “feeling thermometers” for both the Colorado and Liberal parties ranging from very cold
(0) indicating strong opposition to very hot (40) indicating strong support. If the broker assigned
a higher value to the Colorado party and the voter stated that he supports the Colorado party, we
code the broker’s response as accurate. We do the same for the Liberal party. If the broker puts
the same value on both parties’ feeling thermometers and the voter states he supports another party
(UNACE or Patria Querida) or no party, we also indicate this as accurate.
Broker knows if voter turned out to vote: an indicator that the broker accurately knows whether
the voter turned out to vote in the 2006 election. To estimate this, we cross-checked the voter’s
response with the broker’s corresponding statement.
Broker knows the frequency with which the voter would retaliate: an indicator that the broker
accurately states the frequency with which the voter would retaliate wrongdoing. In particular,
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voters were asked the following question: “If someone puts you in a difficult situation, would you
do the same to her/him?” Answers were always, sometimes, or never. Similarly brokers were
asked the same question about each voter.
Broker knows if voter generally trusts others in the village: an indicator that the broker accu-
rately knows if the voter would trust at least half of those in his or her village.
Absolute age difference: the absolute value of the difference between the broker’s and the voter’s
ages.
Broker and voter have the same gender: an indicator that the voter and broker have the same
gender.
Geographical distance between broker’s and voter’s residences: Geographical distance in kilo-
meters between the broker’s and voter’s residences.
A.2 Variables only using broker responses
Broker knows voter: an indicator variable that the broker states that he or she knows the voter.
Broker offered the voter something: an indicator that the broker offered the voter either food,
medicines, paying his or her bills, free plowing of land, or money during the electoral campaign.
The relevant survey question asked about all of these items at once, therefore we cannot create a
variable for the specific type of good offered.
Broker approached the voter: an indicator that the broker approached the voter during the elec-
toral campaign to speak about the election.
A.3 Variables only using voter responses
Voter supports the broker’s party: an indicator that, in 2007 a few months after the 2006 elec-
tions, the voter states he supports the party that the broker works for.
Not registered to the same party: an indicator that the voter is not registered to the party for
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which the broker works, which also includes the case where the voter is not registered to any
political party.
Experimental reciprocity: a measure of reciprocity computed using data from individual trust
games played with voters in 2002 as described in Finan and Schechter (2012) and as described in
Section 3.
A.4 Network variables
Hearing: the expected number of times that a broker j might hear a piece of information originat-
ing from a voter i if information is diffused with probability pi for T periods. Following Banerjee
et al. (2019), as our baseline we set T equal to 7, which is the maximum social distance between
any voter and any broker in all the village networks in our sample, and pi equal to the inverse of
the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix representing the social network in each village.
Broker/Voter’s diffusion centrality: the average expected total number of times that a piece
of information originating from a broker/voter node is heard by all individuals in the network if
information diffuses for T periods (Banerjee et al., 2013). Following Banerjee et al. (2019), we set
T equal to 10, which is the diameter, or maximum social distance between any two individuals in
all the village networks in our sample.
Social Proximity: the inverse of social distance. Social distance is the length of the shortest path
between a broker and a voter, when these can reach each other through their network. In the case
of unreachable pairs, social proximity is coded as zero.
Existence of a support pair: an indicator for whether a broker and a voter share a first-degree
connection (i.e., whether they share a common friend). The construct of support is proposed by
Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer and Tan (2012) as a measure of enforcement ability in social net-
works.
Number of support pairs: the number of shared first-degree connections between a broker and a
voter.
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Previous transaction: an indicator for whether one of the following non-political informal trans-
actions took place between the broker’s and voter’s households in the year surrounding the election:
• a member of one individual’s household provided assistance when a member of the other
individual’s household fell sick, or
• a member of one individual’s household provided a member of the other individual’s house-
hold with a monetary or in-kind transfer, or
• a member of one individual’s household lent money to a member of the other individual’s
household.
Broker/Voter’s degree centrality: the number of individuals to which a broker/voter is directly
connected.
Broker/Voter’s betweenness centrality: the proportion of shortest paths between any two indi-
viduals that pass through the broker/voter.
Broker/Voter’s eigenvector centrality: a recursively defined measure where the centrality of
a broker/voter is positively correlated with the centrality of the individuals with which the bro-
ker/voter is directly connected.
Broker/Voter’s clustering coefficient: the number of actual connections between the nodes within
a broker/voter’s neighborhood divided by the total possible number of connections between them.
Absolute difference in diffusion centrality: the absolute difference in the diffusion centrality of
the broker and voter.
Absolute difference in degree centrality: the absolute difference in the degree centrality of the
broker and voter.
Absolute difference in betweenness centrality: the absolute difference in the betweenness cen-
trality of the broker and voter.
Absolute difference in eigenvector centrality: the absolute difference in the eigenvector central-
ity of the broker and voter.
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Absolute difference in clustering: the absolute difference in the clustering coefficient of the
broker and voter.
Freeman segregation index (FSI): given the affiliation to two political parties, FSI = 1− ppi ,
where p is the observed proportion of between-party connections and pi is the expected proportion
given that connections are generated randomly. It ranges between 0 (random network) and 1 (fully
segregated partisan groups). Although p could be greater than pi , the index truncates negative
values, which correspond to networks in which the proportion of between-group connections is
greater than what would be expected by chance.
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Table B1: Summary statistics of network centrality measures for all households in our villages,
and by broker and voter households
Observations Mean Standard
Deviation
Non-standardized Network Measures
Broker Network Measures
Degree centrality 32 7.969 4.540
Betweenness centrality 32 0.031 0.032
Diffusion centrality 32 9.351 4.247
Eigenvector centrality 32 0.136 0.073
Voter Network Measures
Degree centrality 1,000 4.585 4.304
Betweenness centrality 1,000 0.019 0.036
Diffusion centrality 1,000 5.111 4.749
Eigenvector centrality 1,000 0.066 0.070
Broker and Voter Network Measures
Degree centrality 1,032 4.690 4.349
Betweenness centrality 1,032 0.019 0.036
Diffusion centrality 1,032 5.243 4.789
Eigenvector centrality 1,032 0.068 0.071
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Table B2: Effect of hearing on vote-buying targeting and brokers’ knowledge about voters, by
other party hearing
Vote-buying targeting Overall knowledge
index index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Mean Other Party Hearing
Hearing 0.2786*** 0.2649*** 0.2186*** 0.2308***
(0.0632) (0.0674) (0.0491) (0.0560)
Mean other party hearing -0.1020 -0.1146 0.0096 0.0213
(0.0912) (0.0923) (0.0770) (0.0839)
Hearing ×Mean
other party hearing
-0.0017 -0.0026
(0.0426) (0.0505)
Mean of Dependent Variable
Broker FE X X X X
Voter FE X X X X
Observations 932 932 932 932
R2 0.6135 0.6139 0.6565 0.6572
Panel B: Maximum Other Party Hearing
Hearing 0.2715*** 0.2689*** 0.2218*** 0.2336***
(0.0603) (0.0652) (0.0512) (0.0566)
Max. other party hearing -0.1037 -0.1088 0.0152 0.0227
(0.0854) (0.0818) (0.0623) (0.0639)
Hearing ×Max.
other party hearing
-0.0592 -0.0063
(0.0464) (0.0456)
Mean of Dependent Variable
Broker FE X X X X
Voter FE X X X X
Observations 932 932 932 932
R2 0.6140 0.6150 0.6566 0.6573
Notes: All specifications include broker and voter fixed effects. The vote-buying targeting index is
a standardized index that takes the sum of indicators for whether the broker offered the voter some-
thing during the electoral campaign and whether the broker approached the voter to talk about the elec-
toral campaign. The Overall knowledge index is a standardized index that aggregates indices from all
the three knowledge categories: covariates, political, and social preferences. Hearing is standardized.
“Mean other party hearing” represents the standardized average value of hearing of brokers from the
other party. “Max. other party hearing” is the standardized highest value of hearing of brokers from
the other party. Standard errors use two-way clustering at the broker and voter levels. * p < 0.10, **
p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Table B3: Effect of hearing on vote-buying targeting, by transaction-enforcement measures
Vote-buying targeting index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hearing 0.1919 0.3606*** 0.1926 0.3199***
(0.1540) (0.0742) (0.1189) (0.0569)
Social proximity 0.0468
(0.0937)
Number of support pairs -0.0953
(0.1083)
Existence of a support pair -0.0317
(0.1166)
Previous transaction -0.1072
(0.2981)
Social proximity ×
Hearing
0.0435
(0.0508)
Existence of a support pair×
Hearing
0.0173
(0.0403)
Number of support pairs ×
Hearing
0.1800
(0.1303)
Previous transaction ×
Hearing
0.0720
(0.1496)
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
Broker FE X X X X
Voter FE X X X X
Observations 932 932 932 932
R2 0.6138 0.6137 0.6147 0.6130
Notes: All specifications include broker and voter fixed effects. The dependent variable is a
standardized index that takes the sum of indicators for whether the broker offered the voter
something during the electoral campaign and whether the broker approached the voter to talk
about the electoral campaign. Standard errors use two-way clustering at the broker and voter
levels. * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Table B4: Effect of hearing with T set to the maximum broker-voter social distance for each
village and after dropping villages with lowest sampling rates
Vote-buying Overall
targeting knowledge
index index
(1) (2)
Panel A: T set to the maximum broker-voter social distance for each village
Hearing (set to village max.
broker-voter social distance)
0.2379*** 0.1502***
(0.0449) (0.0253)
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.0000 0.0000
Broker FE X X
Voter FE X X
Observations 932 932
R2 0.6129 0.6556
(1) (2)
Panel B: Dropping villages with lowest sampling rates
Hearing 0.4093*** 0.2387***
(0.0614) (0.0445)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.0000 -0.0000
Broker FE X X
Voter FE X X
Observations 698 698
R2 0.6258 0.6488
Notes: All specifications include broker and voter fixed effects. The index dependent variables
are standardized. Hearing is standardized. Panel A runs similar specifications to those in
Tables 3 and 5 while calculating hearing by setting T equal to the maximum social distance
between any voter and broker in the village network. Panel B runs the similar specifications to
those in Tables 3 and 5 while excluding the two villages with the lowest sampling rates, which
account for 27% of the sample. Standard errors use two-way clustering at the broker and voter
levels. * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
56
Table B5: Effect of hearing on constituent components of the indices of brokers’ knowledge
about voters
Knows Knows voter’s Knows voter’s
Knows voter’s amount of years of
voter spouse land education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Covariates index component measures
Hearing 0.0344*** 0.0784*** 0.0603** 0.0404**
(0.0103) (0.0219) (0.0280) (0.0186)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.8873 0.7725 0.4206 0.8069
Broker FE X X X X
Voter FE X X X X
Observations 932 932 932 932
R2 0.6359 0.5789 0.5524 0.6090
Knows the frequency Knows whether the
Knows voter’s Knows whether the with which the voter voter generally trusts
partisanship voter votes would retaliate others in the village
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B: Political and Social Preferences index component measures
Hearing 0.0971*** 0.0632*** 0.0500* 0.0554***
(0.0351) (0.0222) (0.0272) (0.0138)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.5933 0.6288 0.5858 0.6556
Broker FE X X X X
Voter FE X X X X
Observations 932 932 932 932
R2 0.5362 0.7056 0.6524 0.7760
Notes: All specifications include broker and voter fixed effects. Hearing is standardized. Standard
errors use two-way clustering at the broker and voter levels. * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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Table B6: Effect of hearing on brokers’ overall knowledge, controlling for homophily and
network measures that predict the enforcement ability of the network
Overall knowledge index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hearing 0.1986** 0.2361** 0.1879*** 0.1942*** 0.2138*** 0.3287*
(0.0730) (0.0960) (0.0380) (0.0418) (0.0360) (0.1697)
Social proximity -0.0176 -0.0953
(0.0747) (0.1285)
Existence of a support pair 0.1095 0.2246
(0.0875) (0.1411)
Number of support pairs 0.0350 -0.0976
(0.0490) (0.0781)
Previous transaction 0.0053 0.0381
(0.0734) (0.1110)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Broker FE X X X X X X
Voter FE X X X X X X
Broker-Voter Controls X X
Observations 932 932 932 932 932 932
R2 0.7114 0.6566 0.6574 0.6567 0.6565 0.7131
Notes: All specifications include broker and voter fixed effects. The dependent variables is a standard-
ized index. The Overall knowledge index aggregates indicators from all the three knowledge categories:
covariates, political, and social preferences. Columns (1) and (6) control for the following variables at
the broker-voter level: a) an indicator for the broker and voter having the same gender; b) standardized
geographical distance between the broker’s and voter’s residences; c) standardized absolute difference in
age, degree centrality, clustering coefficient, betweenness centrality, diffusion centrality, and eigenvec-
tor centrality; and d) broker fixed effects interacted with voter’s degree centrality, clustering coefficient,
betweenness centrality, diffusion centrality, and eigenvector centrality. All network measures (except
the indicator variables) are standardized. Standard errors use two-way clustering at the broker and voter
levels. * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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